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Abstract
In contemporary societies, the humanities are under constant pres-
sure and have to justify their existence. In the ongoing debates, 
Humboldt’s ideals of ‘Bildung’ and ‘pure science’ are often used to 
justify the unique function of the humanities of ensuring free re-
search and contributing to a vital and self-reflective democracy. 
Contemporary humanities have adopted a new orientation towards 
practices, and it is not clear how this fits with the ideals of ‘Bildung’ 
and ‘pure science’. A possible theoretical framework for this orien-
tation towards practices could be found in John Dewey’s pragmatic 
philosophy. Contrary to Humboldt’s idea that the non-practical is 
the most practical in the long run, philosophical pragmatism rec-
ommends to the humanities to situate knowledge in practices and 
apply knowledge to practices. 
Keywords History of the humanities, Dewey, Humboldt, pragmatism,
practices
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Ideal and Crisis
Nowadays the humanities are not only under constant pressure to 
justify their existence; they are also under constant transformation. 
In terms of new technologies and methods, the humanities are dem-
onstrating a stunning openness. (Pedersen, Køppe and Stjernfelt 
2015). Digital humanities could be said to be the latest development 
of the adaptive and transformative nature of the humanities (Holm, 
Jarrick and Scott 2015). This heterogeneity was not always present in 
the humanities. Or at least, this is not what ‘the humanities’ and the 
‘liberal arts’ have represented since they were installed by the Hum-
boldt reforms in the beginning of the 19th century. ‘Pure science’ and 
‘Bildung’ are seen as the cornerstones of the humanities and are still 
playing a decisive role in the discussion about the reorientation and 
reorganization of the humanities (Fish 2008; Small 2013).
It seems that the ideal of ‘Bildung’ has lost its magic power and 
attraction for university planners and politicians. In most coun-
tries, the goal of contemporary university education is rather to 
qualify students for a profession and the labor market than to en-
sure their general ‘Bildung’. Universities have certainly changed 
tremendously over the past 20 years; Martha Nussbaum (2010) 
called this development a “silent crisis”. ‘Pure science’, the other 
core ideal of the humanities, has been questioned as well. The so-
called ‘Mode 2’, which was already diagnosed by Gibbons, Limo-
ges and Nowotny in 1994 , is not limited to the natural and the so-
cial sciences; this new orientation towards application and social 
as well as economic impact also affects the humanities (Gibbons, 
Limoges and Nowotny 1994, 90 ff.).
One of the many transformations of the humanities that can be 
identified is a transformation towards practical orientation. This is 
seen, for instance, in the collaboration of the humanities with de-
sign. Humanistic research is beginning to play a valuable part in 
economic value production. Are the humanities able to profit from 
this new practice orientation, and what might their profit be? Some 
will argue that this is the only method of survival for the humani-
ties, while others are warning that the humanities will lose their 
identity (Derewiewicz 2015; Fish 2008). Are the ‘new’ humanities 
still characterized by the traditional ideals of ‘Bildung’ and ‘pure 
science’? This question cannot be answered by a simple yes or no. 
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In this article, I shall pursue the modest ambition of sketching a 
theoretical framework that might enable us to evaluate what practi-
cal orientation could contribute to the humanities. The theoretical 
framework is meant to contribute to the ongoing rearticulation and 
transformation of the humanities in a productive way. The premise 
of this article is therefore that practical orientation is part of the re-
vitalization of the humanities. In the first part, I shall take a closer 
look at the Humboldt university reform and the ideals of ‘Bildung’ 
and ‘pure science’. In the next part, I shall introduce what has been 
coined ‘the practice term’ and shall then use the pragmatism of 
John Dewey as a radicalized form of the practice turn in order to 
understand the practical engagement of the humanities as not 
merely market driven utilization but as a theoretical challenge and 
a contribution to the ongoing revitalization of the humanities.
‘Bildung’ and ‘pure science’ –  
uselessness as a necessary principle?
Are Humboldt’s ideal of ‘Bildung’ and his understanding of the 
humanities still relevant as  normative ideals for universities today? 
Of course, this depends upon what is meant by the Humboldt ide-
als of ‘Bildung’ and ‘pure science’. Usually, four fundamental claims 
characterize Humboldt’s idea of university teaching and research: 
the freedom of teaching and learning, the unity of research and 
teaching, the unity of science and scholarship, and the primacy of 
‘pure’ science, i.e. the absence of utility or use as the motivation and 
goal of science (Ash 2006). A fifth claim that is connected to Hum-
boldt’s idealistic humanism could be added: it is the assumption 
that the humanities provide the means for individuals to be capable 
of self-realization in a reflective way. This claim can be found, for 
instance, in the defense of the humanities which has been expressed 
by Martha Nussbaum (2010), and which can be traced down to 
Humboldt’s idea of education as the ultimate means of realizing 
humanity and human mankind as such. But as also Ash (2006) has 
outlined, the very idealistic connotation that Humboldt’s ideal has 
achieved over time hides the more profane tensions and contradic-
tions between the ideal and its reality. 
First, it should be mentioned that Humboldt’s educational reform 
of the university was a reaction to the decline of the university sys-
tem in Germany in the 17th and 18th centuries (Nipperdey 1983, 57). 
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The Prussian reforms from 1807 – 1821 constitute the second histori-
cally relevant background. The reform of the entire educational sys-
tem, including the universities, constituted a corner stone of the gen-
eral reforms that the Prussian State initiated after the devastating 
results of the Napoleonic wars (Mieck 1981). The Prussian bureau-
cracy needed properly educated civil servants and functionaries, 
and the schools and higher education institutions needed teachers 
and professors trained in systematic knowledge acquisition. Third, 
the educational reform should also be seen against a broader politi-
cal background: Germany had not been a political nation state, and 
the philosophical humanism of Humboldt and others replaced the 
political unification by cultural unification (Plessner 1959). The 
Prussian educational reform, pragmatically driven by the need for 
re-organization of the country, found its ideological underpinnings 
in the idea that higher education provides citizens with a national 
awareness that takes the form of language, culture and mentality. 
Humboldt calls this the realization of humanity in the individual 
(“Begriff der Menschheit in unsrer Person”, Humboldt 1960, 235). 
Today, when Humboldt is referred to when explaining the ne-
cessity of the humanities, what is attractive is precisely the idea of 
integration of individuality within the greater scheme of civil so-
ciety and humankind, as well as the utilization of the creative po-
tential that lies in studying languages and cultures of different 
historical epochs and cultural backgrounds (e.g. Nussbaum 2010). 
This includes the distance to the world of labor and to the market, 
which is a ‘Leitmotiv’ in Humboldt’s thought. Contemporary crit-
icism of the upcoming industrial society with its bourgeois values 
of efficiency and profit forms the context of this distance to voca-
tion. Humboldt’s thinking has sometimes been called aristocratic 
(Kost 2004, 147f.); this assessment contains an implicit critique of 
the ideal of ‘Bildung’. 
What does ‘Bildung’ actually mean for Humboldt? The instru-
ment to realize ‘Bildung’ was the foundation of the Berlin University 
(1809/10) along the principles which have already been mentioned: 
the freedom of teaching and research, the unity of research and 
teaching, the unity of science and scholarship, and the dominance of 
‘pure science’. ‘Bildung’ in Humboldt’s understanding is not a fixed 
goal but rather a lifelong process that the individual realizes as a 
reflective way of leading her life. It is the capacity to not merely 
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make well-informed judgments, which would only be the result of 
material education (factual knowledge). Rather the goal is to enable 
the individual to make judgments that reflect her uniqueness and 
autonomy. This is only achieved with formal education where prin-
ciples and not merely information are taught (Humboldt 1960; Kjær-
gaard/Kristensen 2003, 92f.). In his well-known idealistic manner, 
Humboldt believes that every human being possesses an active 
spirit that is seeking for truth. It is in art and language, in the sym-
bolic universe, that the human spirit recognizes and reflects truth 
and itself (Humboldt 1960). Here Humboldt stands in the tradition 
of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics: pure theory reveals the reason-
able order of reality, while instrumental practice (poiesis) is bound to 
pure chance and failure. This down-playing of practical activities 
had a tremendous influence on education, and we will see that this 
is one of the main features that had been criticized by pragmatism.
For Humboldt, it was clear that the danger of alienation to nature 
lurks behind an activity that is not centered in the individual itself 
(Humboldt 1960, 237). ‘Poiesis’ is, so to speak, potentially a danger-
ous activity that could allow the outer world to assume power over 
the individual. For Humboldt, the humanities guarantee for a total-
ity of knowledge that is not scattered into bits and pieces but dem-
onstrates inner coherence. And here the other corner stone of Hum-
boldt’s new type of university becomes important.  ‘Bildung’ can 
only be realized as ‘pure science’. It is an approach to science that is 
theoretical, not interested in practical purposes, economic profit or 
other forms of utility (Humboldt 1809/10). ‘Pure science’ is free re-
search, not only in the humanities, but also in the natural sciences. 
From the orientation to ‘Wissenschaft’ or ‘pure science’ follows also 
that teaching cannot be isolated from research, which is intrinsically 
an open endeavor. The unity of research and teaching turns both 
professors and students into researchers (Humboldt 1960). This is 
an ideal that has been most influential and still is, also for modern 
universities (Ash 2006). 
For Humboldt, ‘Bildung’ as the educational ideal that is non-voca-
tional and defined by distance to utilization guarantees that the stu-
dent will be able to realize individuality and humanity. This was the 
revolutionary thought of Humboldt: only by being disinterested in 
what purpose one’s education could serve will the student learn to 
gain the autonomy to fulfill different purposes in the long run. This 
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also applies to ‘pure science’. The absence of direct interests of an 
economic or societal nature opens for the researcher’s autonomy 
and truth seeking. The absence of purpose and utility in Humboldt’s 
ideal also excludes  the interests and needs of societies. In Hum-
boldt’s understanding, societies are best served by humanities not 
being directly oriented towards societal problems (Humboldt 
1809/1810). As also outlined by Habermas (1968), this idealistic self-
understanding of the humanities is flawed. The idea of ‘pure sci-
ence’ maintains the strong belief that pure theory is able to represent 
the world as totality. Therefore, for Humboldt, ‘Bildung’ is most 
practical precisely because it is non-practical. Habermas criticizes 
this understanding of theory by demonstrating the hidden interests 
behind the allegedly neutral theory. According Habermas’ analysis, 
science and humanities are always already bound to interests. He 
recommends a critical and emancipatory interest that guides the 
process of knowledge acquisition. In his approach, the emancipa-
tory interest complements the technical interest of the natural sci-
ences and the self-understanding of the hermeneutics in humanities. 
But what if humanities themselves become practically orient-
ed? Do they have to part with the critical spirit and the ideals of 
humanity? 
Pragmatism and Practice Turn – approaches to practices
As already mentioned, parts of contemporary humanities do em-
brace new technologies and look for a more practical orientation. 
And it should be pointed out that this is not a development that is 
first and foremost the result of political pressure to ensure that hu-
manistic graduates are able to find jobs. Humanities that are seek-
ing new grounds and are transgressing their boundaries could be 
seen to be part of the contemporary “ongoing rearticulation of the 
role of the humanities” (Ekström, in this volume) which is already 
taking place.  
Yet, it is not always clear what type of theoretical orientation 
could support the practice orientation of the humanities. Obvious-
ly, the humanities have always dealt with practices, but mostly with 
narrating and interpreting practices. Seeing interpretation itself as a 
practice and recognizing that there is more to practices than text 
represents an orientation switch that is in the center of a recent 
broad theoretical movement called the ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki 
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et al. 2001). ‘Practice turn’ is an umbrella term that covers quite dif-
ferent approaches, such as Bourdieu’s sociology or Latour’s actor-
network-theory. Their common ground is that practices shift from 
being narrated and interpreted as explanandum to being part of the 
explanans itself. Andreas Reckwitz (2002) has proposed the system-
atization of the practice turn or, as he prefers to phrase it, ‘practice 
theory’. Practice theory “revises the hyperrational and intellectual-
ized picture of human agency and the social offered by classical 
and high-modern social theories. Practice theory ‘decentres’ mind, 
texts and conversation. Simultaneously, it shifts bodily movements, 
things, practical knowledge and routine to the centre of its vocabu-
lary.” (Reckwitz 2002, 259).  The ‘practice turn’ includes the broad-
ening of the humanities in terms of methodology, theoretical ap-
proach, and subject matter. An even more radicalized practical 
approach has been developed by the classical pragmatist John 
Dewey (Gimmler 2012). 
From Dewey’s perspective, the use of new technologies and tools 
does not necessarily change the self-understanding of the humani-
ties. A real change would demand that the humanities not only 
develop knowledge in practical contexts but also apply knowledge 
in these. The result of this operation would be a learning process: 
“To ‘learn from experience’ is to make a backward and 
forward connection between what we do to things and 
what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Un-
der such conditions, doing becomes a trying; an experi-
ment with the world to find out what it is like; the under-
going becomes instruction--discovery of the connection 
of things.” (Dewey 2008c, ch. 11) 
In contrast to Humboldt, Dewey sees learning and research not as 
a development towards a pre-given goal, a “ready-made latent 
principle” (Dewey 2008c, ch. 4, 2). For Dewey, learning is an open 
and experimental process that unfolds between the individual and 
the environment. The core principle of this process is experience, 
and experience is always situated within practices. Experience un-
folds as an activity between an organism and its environment, it is 
not merely a form of perception or an epistemological stance to-
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Volume
13 23
Practicing Humanities
Antje Gimmler
wards the objective world. Three dimensions of experience can be 
distinguished in Dewey’s philosophy: 
The first dimension is the experience of something in a situation; 
this is what Dewey calls primary or immediate experience: “Experi-
ence is double-threaded in the sense that in its primary wholeness, 
it does not differentiate between act and material, subject and ob-
ject. It includes both in its unanalysed totality.” (Dewey 2008a, 18). 
Experience demonstrates qualities that are experienced as specific, 
for instance with the body and the senses. Experiences are thus situ-
ated. A situation, for Dewey, is characterized by being a disruption 
of the usual way of acting. Primary or immediate experience takes 
a heuristic function and sets the stage for further experiences. Ap-
plied to humanistic research, it follows that the sensitivity to iden-
tify disruptions has to be refined, and the definition of relevant 
problems should employ a broad range of methodologies. 
The next dimension of experience is best described as ‘to be expe-
rienced in something’. Experience in this sense is sedimented in 
recipes, in tools and in the body (Dewey 2008a, 21 ff.). Experience is 
often tacit knowledge. An artist ‘knows’ how to treat the material 
and the tool she is using. Experience of this practical and physical 
but not exclusively linguistic kind is present in three contexts: first, 
in tools, second, in the artefact or product, and third, in the activity. 
This dimension of experience would allow the artist to incorporate 
practices of different kinds and to go beyond the purely contempla-
tive stance towards products of culture or symbolic systems. 
The third dimension of Dewey’s understanding of experience 
has Hegelian traits (Gimmler 2004). Interacting with the world, we 
also make experiences with ourselves, reflecting our ideas and in-
vesting hypotheses or theories. Within the framework of research 
as a process, Dewey outlines this third dimension of experience as 
the controlled production of knowledge, for example through ex-
periment, statistical investigation and other methods (Dewey 2008a, 
105ff.). For Dewey it is decisive that with reflected experience, hu-
man beings control actions and at the same time gain knowledge 
about themselves. Taking this experimental approach, self-reflec-
tion in the humanities would be contested in a productive way. 
Taking Dewey’s theory of experience into account, traditional 
philosophy could be said to have cultivated irrelevance as a distin-
guished virtue. What is lacking in traditional philosophy for Dewey 
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is, oddly enough, learning. In his view, philosophy should become 
empirical. Bringing the results of a process of experience back into 
experience and making them useful for practices would strengthen 
the validity of philosophical ideas. A look at the natural sciences 
could help to understand this point. From Dewey’s point of view, 
the natural sciences are not successful because they achieve true 
representations of the natural world; as a matter of fact, Dewey was 
very critical about the positivist understanding of the natural sci-
ences. The success of the natural sciences lies in their experimental 
use of experience in order “to have a new empirical situation in 
which objects are differently related to each other, and such that the 
consequences of directed operations have the property of being 
known” (Dewey 2008b, 70). However, the blind application of the 
scientific method as such is not Dewey’s goal. The experimental 
orientation to philosophy recommended by Dewey could also be 
applied, mutatis mutandis, to the humanities. Reflected integration 
of humanistic research and education into the practices that regu-
late, stimulate and develop societies in a more direct and active way 
could be one of the results of Dewey’s theory of experience. Firstly, 
a pragmatic version of the humanities would put cultural symbols 
back into practices. Secondly, pragmatists would acknowledge the 
collaborative and collective nature of these practices. And thirdly, 
pragmatists would suggest that also the humanities should use 
their theories and interpretations to improve democratic practices; 
this is the melioristic aim of pragmatism. It is clear from this short 
presentation of Dewey’s pragmatism that the humanities should 
not confine themselves to purely theoretical constructions. The 
Humboldt paradox of impractical theory being the most practical is 
not supported by Dewey.
Concluding remarks 
If philosophy and the humanities were to put their theories to test, 
what would philosophy and the humanities gain? First of all, it 
should be stated that the main arena for humanistic theories, con-
cepts, ideas, and narration is the scientific community and the pub-
lic debate. This is completely legitimate from Dewey´s point of 
view. However, a more rigorous reading of Dewey’s theory would 
emphasize the practical grounding of the humanities. Let me con-
centrate on two major changes which, according to the pragmatic 
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theory of experience, are connected with the new orientation in hu-
manities towards practices: First, the introduction of experience-
based humanities would situate the humanities in a broader spec-
trum of interactions with the world. The definition of a relevant 
research problem is only possible on the basis of a full range of ex-
perience. If the latter is not available, the problem definition is 
always in danger of repeating text book problems and being de-
tached from real world problems. Recent approaches within the 
‘practice turn’ reflect this and focus much more on materialities of 
experience, without leaving the symbolic dimension of meaning 
aside (Rinkinen, Jalal and Shove 2015).  Secondly, not only the basis 
of humanistic research in the richness of experience is advocated 
by Dewey; it is also recommended to bring the results back to real 
life practices in order to validate humanistic theories and ideas. The 
latter seems to be problematic:  ‘Testing’ a hypothesis in historical 
science is not possible in the same way as a hypothesis is tested in 
chemistry. But actually this is what happens in design-oriented hu-
manities: The semantic classifications that are used to establish a 
structured data collection are tested in computer software. Digital 
or design humanities might be one type of humanities among oth-
ers that is experimenting with new methods, thus changing the out-
look on the humanities. The plurality of approaches and an aca-
demic community flourishing with heterogeneity rather than with 
homogeneity could be one result of this development. 
The aim of this article was to contribute to an understanding of 
the changes humanities are currently undergoing. The practice 
turn that decenters our focus from texts and symbols to the rich-
ness of all sorts of experiences is one step in this direction. Dewey’s 
theory of experience enables us to conceptualize this change as a 
radical one. The Humboldt paradox that ‘Bildung’ and ‘pure sci-
ence’ should not address practical goals directly and is precisely 
therefore able to be practical in a deeper sense, is highly question-
able from the pragmatic point of view. Dewey’s philosophy could 
provide a framework for conceptualizing the humanities beyond 
the simple alternatives of ‘pure science’ and ‘applied science’; jux-
taposing these alternatives always insinuates that ‘pure science’ is 
based on truth seeking, while ‘applied science’ is contaminated 
by the nasty odor of being subordinated to economic constraints. 
Dewey’s concept of philosophy applied to the humanities aims at 
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including intellectual achievements into everyday life experience. 
With this ideal, he would want the humanities to collaborate with 
other fields of science, including the natural sciences and engineer-
ing. This would enable certain parts of the humanities to enter into 
a radical relationship of practice and would finally depart from the 
contemplative understanding of knowledge. Theoretical concepts 
and ideas will then be subjugated to strict operationalization that 
takes seriously the pragmatic motto that a concept is understood 
only when one sees the consequences of its work. 
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